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I. INTRODUCTION
( HE MILITARY don't start wars. Politicians start wars."'
.1. Considering the constitutional framework of the United
States, General William Westmoreland was correct when he ut-
tered these famous words.' The Executive and Legislative
Branches have separate constitutional powers with regard to de-
cisions concerning war. Under Article II, Section Two of the
* J.D. Candidate 2014, UCLA School of Law; Claremont McKenna College,
2011. The author would like to thank Professor Michael Small and his parents,
Lizette and Stephen Chanock.
1 THE QUOTABLE POLITICIAN 40 (William B. Whitman ed., 2003).
2 See id.
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Constitution, the President is the "Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States."3 This constitutional provi-
sion provides the President with the power to control the mili-
tary in times of war.4 Under Article I, Section Eight, Congress
has the power " [t] o declare war," to "raise and support Armies,"
and "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy."5 This gives Congress
the power to determine when to engage in war.6
From the birth of the United States to the Vietnam War, the
United States had only declared war five times, the last time be-
ing during World War II. Although Congress has not "de-
clared" war in numerous circumstances, it has often authorized
war by passing resolutions.8 One of the most prominent exam-
ples is the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964, which authorized
the President to take action to "repel any armed attack against
the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggres-
sion" in southeast Asia.9 The Executive Branch extended and
expanded the Vietnam War far beyond what Congress had ini-
tially authorized, which resulted in thousands of American
soldiers losing their lives.10
In 1973, after the end of the tumultuous Vietnam War, Con-
gress believed that the Executive Branch had abused its war
power." Congress wanted to restore its constitutionally man-
dated control over the war-making process and assure Ameri-
cans that Congress would "prevent similar tragedies in the
future."1 2 As a result, Congress enacted the War Powers Resolu-
tion (WPR) with enough votes to overcome a presidential veto
3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
4 See id.
5 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11-13.
6 See id.
7 JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31133,
DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 1 (2013), available at https://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31133.pdf.
8 See id.
9 H.R.J. RES. 1145, 88th Cong. (1964) (enacted).
10 See Edwin B. Firmage, The War Power of Congress and Revision of the War Powers
Resolution, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 237, 248 (1991).
11 See id. at 248-49.
12 Robert F. Turner, The War Powers Resolution: An Unnecessary, Unconstitutional
Source of "Friendly Fire" in the War Against International Terrorism?, FEDERALIST SoC'v





by Richard Nixon." As this article points out, the WPR-and
more specifically, the Hostilities Provision of the WPR (Hostili-
ties Provision)-is imperfect and flawed. The intention of Con-
gress did not come to fruition, and it can be argued that the
Executive Branch has even more power than before the enact-
ment of the WPR. Although it was almost impossible to predict
at the time, the WPR and the Hostilities Provision were not ade-
quately designed to address the future of warfare. The emer-
gence of new military tactics such as Predator drones and cyber-
warfare has exposed the weaknesses of the WPR"4 and illustrates
that the United States needs to update this law. This article fo-
cuses on the unique and complex issues posed by drones and
cyber-warfare, and proposes possible ways to update the WPR to
properly accommodate these new warfare strategies. However,
the proposed prescriptions for the WPR and the Hostilities Pro-
vision regarding drone warfare and cyber-warfare are not the
same because each tactic poses its own unique problems and
requires a different approach to the solution.
II. PROVISIONS OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
The WPR is divided into nine sections, the first five of which
are relevant to this discussion.' The first section declares that
the President can only "introduce" the U.S. military "pursuant
to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization,
or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces."" The
second section requires the President to consult with Congress
"in every possible instance" before "introducing the [U.S. mili-
tary] into hostilities or into situations where [hostilities are] im-
minent," and to continue such consultations as long as U.S.
Armed Forces remain in "such situations."" The third section
sets forth the reporting requirements for the Executive
Branch.' The fourth section, which will be referred to as the
Hostilities Provision, concerns congressional actions and proce-
dures." The most important part of the Hostilities Provision is
13 Firmage, supra note 10, at 249.
14 See Judah A. Druck, Droning On: The War Powers Resolution and the Numbing
Effect of Technology-Driven Warfare, 98 CORNELL L. REv. 209, 209-10 (2012).
15 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2006).
16 Id. § 1541.
17 Id. § 1542.
18 Id. § 1543.
19 See id. § 1544.
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the sixty-day time limit, which states that once hostilities begin,
Congress has sixty days to approve continued military action un-
less Congress "is physically unable to meet as a result of an
armed attack."o2 If this time passes with no congressional author-
ization, the President must remove the forces.2 1 The fifth part is
the definition section.2 2
The Hostilities Provision has created ambiguity and serious
problems for the WPR because it is very difficult to define. Con-
gress did not espouse a clear definition of what constitutes "hos-
tilities" under the WPR,2 but the history surrounding it
provides some insight. In drafting the WPR, the House Subcom-
mittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments
inserted the word "hostilities" for "armed conflict" so that the
resolution would be broader in scope. 24 This change was meant
to "encompass[ ] a state of confrontation in which no shots have
been fired but where there is a clear and present danger of
armed conflict."" After the WPR was passed, the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs further tried to clarify "hostilities" by
explicitly stating that it includes combat and any situation
"where there is a clear and present danger of armed conflict."2 6
However, history has shown that this definition has not cleared
up the Hostilities Provision's ambiguity problem.2 7 In light of
the ambiguity, many Presidents have sought to avoid the Hostili-
ties Provision's sixty-day clock by asserting that the use of mili-
tary forces did not involve hostilities and thus the sixty-day clock
was not triggered.
One of the Hostilities Provision's key functions is defining
when the sixty-day clock is triggered.2 ' However, this Provision
has never been directly utilized to stop a military engagement.3 0
20 See id.
21 Id.
22 Id. § 1545.
23 See id. § 1541(a).
24 RIcHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32267, THE WAR POWERS
RESOLUTION: AFTER THIRTY YEARS (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/man/
crs/RL32267.html.
25 Id.
26 H.R. REP. No. 93-287, at 2351 (1973).
27 Louis Fisher & David Gray Adler, The War Powers Resolution: Time to Say Good-
bye, 113 POL. ScI. Q. 1, 3 (1998), available at http://www.loufisher.org/docs/wpr/
430.pdf.
28 See, e.g., GRIMMETT, supra note 24.
29 See 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2006).




Despite this, no operation before the Kosovo conflict exceeded
the sixty-day period without a grant of express congressional au-
thorization." The Hostilities Provision's ineffectiveness has also
harmed the reporting requirements of the second and third sec-
tions. Only when the President reports under § 1543(a) (1) that
U.S. Armed Forces have been introduced into hostilities or situ-
ations where hostilities are imminent does the clock begin." As
a result, although there have been over a hundred cases where
the President reported to Congress concerning his actions,
many Presidents have refused to report military engagements to
Congress under § 1543(a) (1) due to fears of triggering the
clock and limiting the potential duration of a campaign. 3 Only
President Ford reported to Congress under § 1543(a) (1) during
the capture of the U.S.S. Mayaguez, but he did so after the hostil-
ities had ceased.3 4 This deficiency affords the President more
time to take unilateral action because it is harder for the sixty-
day clock to be triggered under other provisions. 5
A. JUDICIAL BRANCH INTERPRETATION OF THE
HOSTILITIEs PROVISION
The term "hostilities" has not been clearly defined in large
part because of the reluctance of the Judicial Branch to grapple
with the question. In Campbell v. Clinton, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia dismissed Congressman Tom
Campbell's claim that President Clinton violated the WPR by
not removing military forces from hostilities absent congres-
sional authorization.3 6 The court reasoned that there were other
lawful means that Congress could "use to stop a President's war
making" besides resorting to the Judicial Branch. 7 Also, in
Crockett v. Reagan, the court stated that it would be inappropriate
for the court to decide when the hostilities (and therefore the
sixty-day clock) began. 8 The court did mention that there could
be clear-cut cases where it could determine that hostilities had
begun, such as the Vietnam War, but the court gave no standard
31 Geoffrey S. Corn, Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the War Powers
Resolution, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1149, 1176 (2001).
32 50 U.S.C. § 1544.
3 See GRIMMETT, supra note 24.
3 Fisher & Adler, supra note 27, at 11.
3 See id.
36 Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
3 Id. at 23.
38 Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982).
2013] 457
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
for this determination." Most recently, the Judicial Branch dis-
missed a claim brought by ten members of Congress that Presi-
dent Obama had violated the WPR with regard to the Libyan
Civil War,40 which will be discussed subsequently. The District
Court for the District of Columbia concluded that the plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate they had standing-either in their capac-
ity as members of the House of Representatives or as taxpayers.41
It should also be noted that this reluctance on the part of the
Judicial Branch to adjudicate matters of presidential authority to
use military force is not confined to issues relating to the WPR.
Traditionally, the Judicial Branch has mostly refrained from in-
terfering with the Executive Branch on matters of foreign pol-
icy. Thus, it is very unlikely that the judiciary will step in and
solve the Hostilities Provision's ambiguity problem except in
clear-cut cases of full-blown war. As a result, Congress is forced
to develop its own means of enforcing the Hostilities Provision if
it wants to curb executive power.
B. COMPREHENDING THE HOSTILITIES PROVISION THROUGH
HISTORICAL PRACTICE
Since the enactment of the WPR, the ambiguous Hostilities
Provision has caused confusion and problems for Congress in
enforcing the WPR as originally intended. 4 3 "While Congress is
not bound to employ a definition of hostilities construed from
prior military involvements," failing to adhere to precedent
"would discourage the President and Congress from working to-
gether" and would also "encourage future redefinitions of hos-
tilities motivated by political considerations at the expense of
legitimate national security concerns."4 4 From the start, the Hos-
tilities Provision has not been absolute. This is exemplified by
the Ford Administration's statement that periodic exchanges of
fire with hostile forces were not enough to invoke hostilities.4 5
3 Id. at 898-99; see also Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 337 (D.D.C. 1987)
(holding that the court cannot determine whether the U.S. Armed Forces were
"engaged in hostilities or in situations where imminent involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated by the circumstances") (internal quotations omitted).
40 Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 125 (D.D.C. 2011).
41 Id.
42 Fisher & Adler, supra note 27, at 12.
4 Id. at 1.
4 Deanna M. Tuley, The War Powers Resolution: The Questionable Solution, 25 A.F.
L. REv. 244, 261 (1985).
45 COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE WAR POWERS RESOLU-
TION 202 (Comm. Print 1982).
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President Reagan's decision to send troops to Lebanon further
demonstrates the Hostilities Provision's ambiguity.4 6
On August 10, 1982, American troops entered Lebanon for
peacekeeping purposes during the process of removing the Pal-
estinian Liberation Operation (PLO).o The American troops
were ordered to not engage the enemy, but they could act in
self-defense. 4 8 For about a year, there were periodic engage-
ments that included U.S. naval vessels firing at the PLO and
Marines engaging in small firefights. 4 9 However, these hostile
encounters did not lead to the invocation of the Hostilities Pro-
vision until September 27, 1983, when Congress ultimately in-
voked the WPR and stated that the rationale was the death of
four Marines and the wounding of thirty-eight others. 0 As such,
it is evident from this conflict and the Ford Administration's po-
sition that the Hostilities Provision will trigger the sixty-day clock
when the hostile engagements are not periodic and the United
States has suffered casualties."'
As for the imminence standard of the Hostilities Provision,
the First Persian Gulf War provides some insight. On August 7,
1990, President George H.W. Bush ordered American troops
into Saudi Arabia. President Bush stated that the United States
would not engage in hostilities, but would serve only to defend
Saudi Arabia from Iraqi aggression." Despite President Bush's
assertion that U.S. troops would not engage in hostilities, Bush
stated before the first report that "Iraq has massed an enormous
war machine on the Saudi border capable of initiating hostilities
with little or no additional preparation."54 President Bush also
stated on September 16, 1990, that the United States and Iraq
were "'on the brink of war.'" 5 5 As a result of these statements,
46 See Jack Goldsmith, A Way out of the Libya Conundrum: The Lebanon and
Somalia Analogies, LAWFARE (June 21, 2011), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/
06/a-way-out-of-the-libya-conundrum-the-lebanon-and-somalia-analogies/.
47 Tuley, supra note 44, at 258.
48 Id.
4 Id. at 259-60.
50 Id. at 259.
51 Id. at 256-57.
52 George Steven Swan, Presidential Undeclared Warmaking and Functionalist The-
ory: Dellums v. Bush and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 22 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 75, 80 (1991/1992).
53 Id.
54 George H.W. Bush, Address on Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, MILLER CTR. (Aug. 8,
1990), http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/5529.
55 Michael J. Glennon, The Gulf War and the Constitution, 70 FOREIGN Ave. 84,
100 (1991).
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the Bush Administration "cast serious doubt on its claim that
troops were not 'in imminent danger of hostilities.'""'6 However,
despite this confusion, Congress never specified that the deploy-
ment satisfied the imminence standard of the Hostilities Provi-
sion, and thus, the sixty-day clock was not enforced.5 7 If this
conflict is taken as a precedent for the imminence standard,
then it is clear that imminence requires something more than a
massive military buildup on the border of the enemy's country
and the President's statement that the United States is on the
brink of war.58 Although far from clear, the imminence standard
likely pertains to direct, immediate, and inevitable risk of Ameri-
can casualties.
When the conflict intensified in January 1991, Congress fi-
nally gave statutory authorization for U.S. military interven-
tion. 9 It is worth noting that prior to the Authorization for Use
of Military Force Against Terrorists (AUMF), the Persian Gulf
War was the only instance after the enactment of the WPR
where U.S. military engagements were "preceded by express stat-
utory authorization.""o The Persian Gulf War was an overwhelm-
ing military success for the United States," but it did not resolve
the ambiguity of what constitutes "hostilities" and "imminent
hostilities" under the WPR.
C. THE LBYAN CIVIL WAR AND THE FUTURE OF
AMERICAN WARFARE
The recent Libyan Civil War was another military success for
the United States and its allies. 2 However, President Obama's
interpretation of the Hostilities Provision illustrates that this law
and the WPR have become even less effective." Many of the mil-
itary strategic decisions contemplated during this war do not fit
56 Eileen Burgin, Rethinking the Role of the War Powers Resolution: Congress and the
Persian Gulf 21 J. LEGIS. 23, 33 (1995).
57 Id. at 34.
58 See id. at 33-34.
59 H.R.J. RES. 77, 102d Cong. (1991) (enacted).
60 Corn, supra note 31, at 1175.
61 See GRIMMETT, supra note 24.
62 See Owen Jones, The War in Libya Was Seen as a Success, Now Here We Are Engag-
ing with the Blowback in Mali, INDEP. (Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.independent.co.
uk/voices/comment/the-war-in-Libya-was-seen-as-a-success-now-here-we-are-en-
gaging-with-the-blowback-in-Mali-8449588.html.
63 Charlie Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing US. Role in




easily within the confines of the WPR.6 4 As such, this war pro-
vides an excellent example of the need to overhaul the WPR to
effectively accommodate the changing nature of warfare.
On March 21, 2011, the President submitted a report to Con-
gress that he had directed "U.S. military forces [to] com-
mence [ ] operations to assist an international effort authorized
by the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council . . . to prevent a
humanitarian catastrophe and address the threat posed to inter-
national peace and security by the crisis in Libya"; the President
claimed that his actions were consistent with the WPR.65 Follow-
ing this declaration, the U.S. military enforced a no-fly zone
around Libya, used Predator drones to conduct bombing mis-
sions, and provided assistance to the rebel fighters. 6 However,
pursuant to the President's report, the U.S. military did not de-
ploy ground troops."7
Although the United States' intervention was limited, critics
of the Obama Administration contend that the war was illegal
because the Hostilities Provision had been implicated and Con-
gress did not explicitly authorize the use of force before the end
the of the sixty-day clock.68 Harold Koh, Legal Adviser to the
U.S. Department of State, responded to such criticism by stating
that the Administration had complied with the WPR because the
government "act[ed] transparently and in close consultation
with Congress for a brief period[,] with no casualties or ground
troops."6 9 In the executive report to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Administration also argued that the "mili-
tary operations [were] distinct from the kind of 'hostilities' con-
templated by the Resolution's [sixty-day] termination
64 See id.
65 Letter from the President Regarding the Commencement of Operations in Libya,
WHITEHoUSE.GOV (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2011/03/21/letter-president-regarding-commencement-operations-libya.
66 Martha Raddotz & Kirit Radia, Pentagon Confirms First Predator Drone Strike in
Libya, ABC NEWS (Apr. 23, 2011), http://abcnews.com/international/pentagon-
confirms-predator-drone-strike-libya/story?id=13442570.
67 Letter from the President Regarding the Commencement of Operations in Libya, supra
note 65.
68 Jim Geraghty, '1, 2, 3, 4 We Don't Want Your Illegal Kinetic Military Action!',
NAT'L REv. ONLINE (May 19, 2011, 6:57 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/
campaign-spot/267624/1-2-3-4-we-dont-want-your-illegal-kinetic-military-action.
69 See Testimony by Legal Adviser Harold Hongju Koh, U.S. Department of State on
Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 111th
Cong. 12, 14 (June 28, 2011).
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provision."7 0 The Administration further argued that "U.S.
forces [played] a constrained and supporting role" and that the
"U.S. operations [did] not involve sustained fighting or active
exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor [did] they involve ...
U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof."7 1 This final conten-
tion that U.S. involvement did not involve casualties illuminates
a pressing and complex legal issue regarding Predator drones.
During the Libya campaign, the United States conducted 146
drone strikes;72 however, since Predator drones are robotic and
involve no risk of casualties for American soldiers, their use sets
a dangerous precedent of unchecked Executive Branch
power-power used to conduct war-like campaigns without au-
thorization from Congress.
Another key issue raised by the Libya conflict is the use of
cyber-warfare. Although the United States ultimately decided
against conducting cyber-attacks on the Libyan defense infra-
structure, the Obama Administration "intensely debated"
whether to execute this new type of warfare. 7 4 The Administra-
tion balked due to fears that the action might set a dangerous
precedent for other nations and because they were unable to
quickly resolve the issue whether the President had the power to
proceed with such an attack without informing Congress. 5 The
intense discussion of the issue, however, illustrates that cyber-
warfare is becoming a vital instrument of the U.S. military.
Similar to the Predator drone problem, the use of cyber-warfare
poses difficult and complex questions regarding the reach of
the WPR and the potential for an unchecked Executive Branch.
70 DEP'T OF DEF. & DEP'T OF STATE, UNITED STATES AcTIVITIES IN LIBYA 25
(2011), available at http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/204673/united-
states-activities-in-libya-6-15-11 .pdf.
71 Id.
72 Peter W. Singer, Do Drones Undermine Democracy ?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2012, at
SR5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/opinion/sunday/do-
drones-undermine-democracy.html?r=1 &pagewanted=all.
7 See id.
74 Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, U.S. Debated Cyberwarfare in Attack Plan on
Libya, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/world/
africa/cyber-warfare-against-libya-was-debated-by-us.html.
75 Id.
76 Scott Shane & Eric Schmitt, C.IA. Deaths Prompt Surge in U.S. Drone Strikes,




III. INTRODUCTION TO PREDATOR DRONES
The use of drone warfare by the U.S. military has increased
tremendously in recent years. 7 Drone strikes began early on in
the Afghanistan War when President George W. Bush "initiated
cross-border incursions into Pakistan."7 Since then, the use of
drones has grown exponentially.7 1 "[I]n 2009, the U.S. Army re-
ported a 400% increase" in use over the last ten years. 0 The
increase in drone strikes does not appear to be on the decline,
and this military tactic will very likely become more popular in
the future." Since the military and the CIA operate the drone
program, the Executive Branch has control over it.82 It is also
worth noting that there are many contentious legal issues re-
lated to drone strikes; 3 however, this article will only focus on
the issues that directly relate to separation of powers and the
Hostilities Provision.
Under the Obama Administration, the drone program has
been used all over the world to initiate hostilities." Under the
guise of the AUMF, President Obama has ordered strikes in
Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia." The effectiveness of these
strikes and whether the AUMF actually applies have been hotly
contested. 6 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism claims that
as of August 2012, there have been 3,247 deaths, including 852
civilian deaths, attributed to drone strikes. 7 The Obama Admin-
istration claims that drone strikes produce very few civilian
77 See id.
78 Kurt Larson & Zachary Malamud, The United States, Pakistan, the Law of War
and the Legality of Drone Attacks, 10 J. INT'L Bus. & L. 1, 9 (2011).
79 See id.
80 Laurie R. Blank, After "Top Gun": How Drone Strikes Impact the Law of War, 33
U. PA. J. INT'L L. 675, 675 (2012).
81 See Shane & Schmitt, supra note 76.
82 See Tabassum Zakaria & Mark Hosenball, Pentagon to Take Over Some CIA
Drone Operations: Sources, REUTERS (May 20, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2013/05/21/us-usa-drones-idusBRE94kO3720130521.
83 See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Drones and the Dilemma of
Modern Warfare (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 13-34, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=2268596.
84 See Blank, supra note 80, at 675-76.
85 See John Odle, Comment, Targeted Killings in Yemen and Somalia: Can the
United States Target Low-Level Terrorists?, 27 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 603, 616 (2013).
86 See id. at 629.
87 Simon Rogers, US Drone Strikes Listed and Detailed in Pakistan, Somalia and
Yemen, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/
2012/aug/02/us-drone-strikes-data.
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deaths;" however, ajoint study by Stanford Law School and New
York University School of Law argues that the Administration
has grossly misrepresented the civilian casualty numbers and
only 2% of casualties are "'high-level' targets." 9 Although it is
virtually impossible to determine which of these accounts is ac-
curate, it seems likely that the government has not adequately
reported the casualty figures because the Administration wants
to downplay any potential controversy for diplomatic reasons;
but the extent of this possible downplay is also difficult to ascer-
tain. Despite the uncertain casualty statistics, it is worth noting
that drone strikes are more precise and can minimize civilian
casualties better than long-range artillery strikes or high aerial
bombings.90
A vital aspect of the drone program is that it does not directly
lead to American casualties." The drone pilots work in the
United States, far away from any enemy return-fire. However,
drone strikes alienate the local civilian population," and there
is mounting evidence that drone strikes are related to retaliatory
attacks on America and its allies.94 One prominent example of
such retaliation is the would-be Times Square bomber, who "was
drawn into terrorism by" drone strikes in Pakistan.95 Similarly, a
Yemen strike in May 2010 "provoked a revenge attack on an oil
pipeline by local tribesmen and produced a propaganda bo-
nanza for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula."9 6 It is difficult to
fully comprehend the degree of influence that these drone
strikes have on terrorist recruitment and whether these attacks
or similar attacks would have occurred absent the drone pro-
gram. However, they illustrate that the risk of American casual-
ties is not eliminated just because Americans are not directly in
harm's way during these strikes.
88 Odle, supra note 85, at 652.
89 CNN Wire Staff, Drone Strikes Kill, Maim and Traumatize Too Many Citizens,
U.S. Study Says, CNN.com (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/25/
world/asia/pakistan-us-drone-strikes/index.html.
90 Cheri Kramer, The Legality of Targeted Drone Attacks as U.S. Policy, 9 SANTA
CLARA J. INT'L L. 375, 388 (2011).
91 See id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 389.
94 See Singer, supra note 72.
95 Id.
96 Scott Shane et al., Secret Assault on Terrorism Widens on Two Continents, N.Y.




A. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE WPR FOR INCORPORATING
DRONE WARFARE
The unique, virtual impossibility of direct American casualties
raises serious issues about the WPR's relevance and Congress's
ability to authorize such attacks.97 Given the history of the WPR,
it is highly unlikely that the President will report drone warfare
under § 1543(a) (1) and limit his decision-making power." His-
torical practice leads to the conclusion that the Hostilities Provi-
sion will only be invoked by an act of Congress or automatically
when American troops are killed in combat." However, since
Congress rarely invokes the Hostilities Provision and American
troops do not face the risk of death under a drone strike policy,
the President has extremely broad authority to conduct drone
warfare campaigns with few to no limitations imposed by
Congress. 00
A recent example that highlights these concerns is the crash
of a U.S. drone in eastern Iran in late 2011.101 The U.S. military
claimed that the drone was not in Iranian airspace and that it
had malfunctioned, while the Iranians claimed that the drone
was shot down in Iranian airspace. 0 2 Although it is difficult to
ascertain which story is correct, the downed drone illustrates a
dangerous proposition: the Executive Branch can potentially
send a drone into another country without authorization from
Congress and still not face the repercussions of the Hostilities
Provision.103 If the Iranian story is correct, the Hostilities Provi-
sion still would not have been invoked even though a U.S. mili-
tary aircraft entered another country because, although the
drone was shot down, there were no American casualties. 104
Even the imminence standard of the Hostilities Provision"0 '
could not be invoked because there was never any risk of Ameri-
97 See id.
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can casualties. If the Hostilities Provision cannot be automati-
cally invoked, a dangerous situation could exist where the
Executive Branch secretly and continually sends drones into
Iran over a period of sixty days, creating tensions that could eas-
ily escalate into war. Yet, in this hypothetical situation, Congress
would have had no involvement in the decisions; this highlights
the ineffectiveness of the WPR in the drone warfare context.
Because the capabilities of Predator drones pose serious
problems to the WPR, Congress and the Executive Branch need
to work together to amend the WPR to appropriately accommo-
date this new military strategy. If the WPR is not adequately
amended, its original intention of involving Congress in war-
making decisions will become moot. One possible solution is to
explicitly adjust the Hostilities Provision to address drone
strikes. Congress can do this in a number of ways. First, Con-
gress can amend the Hostilities Provision to state that drones are
the equivalent of U.S. forces for purposes of the provision. This
amendment would solve the casualty dilemma for drones be-
cause, under this framework, Congress would consider a shot-
down drone in the same manner as a killed U.S. soldier.
Another potential solution is for Congress to set a historical
precedent that implies that hostilities necessarily include drone
strikes. For example, in the context of the Libyan Civil War,
Congress could have passed a resolution stating that the Hostili-
ties Provision had been implicated and the sixty-day clock had
therefore started because of drone warfare. Passing such a reso-
lution would alert future Presidents that using drones would
force Congress to start the sixty-day clock. Although it is similar
in effect to amending the WPR, this solution would likely be
easier to implement because Congress would not have to agree
on the specifics of amending the Hostilities Provision. Also, by
setting a historical precedent, there would be a framework
within which Congress could work. This framework would not
solve all the ambiguities of the Hostilities Provision, but it would
give Congress more avenues to invoke the Provision when it
seems clear that the Executive Branch's deployment of drones
has overstepped its bounds. This potential solution would also
make it clear that using drones to initiate a conflict without con-
gressional approval will not be tolerated.
One of the counterarguments to these proposed solutions is
that the WPR does not need to be amended to incorporate solu-
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tions to the problems associated with drones.10 To respond to
criticism that there is no congressional oversight of the drone
program, Senator Feinstein wrote an op-ed article stating that
the Senate Intelligence Committee devotes a significant amount
of time and attention to the program.1 0 7 She stated that they
"receive notification with key details shortly after every strike,"
and the Committee "hold [s] regular briefings and hearings on
these operations."10 Senator Feinstein's comments illustrate the
counterargument that Congress is involved in the decision-mak-
ing process1 9 and that the WPR's original intention of involving
Congress in war-making decisions has been satisfied, albeit in a
different manner than originally intended,o but in a manner
that is strategically practical in contemporary military affairs."'
Therefore, further changes are unnecessary.' 12
This counterargument is insufficient for a couple of reasons.
One reason is the Legislative Branch as a whole does not partici-
pate in the decision-making process."1 s Only select members of
Congress have access to the data.114 Also, congressional involve-
ment is ex poste and not ex ante."' According to Senator Fein-
stein, the Senate Intelligence Committee oversees the program
and its effectivenes, but it is not involved in the decision-making
process."16 Granted, after reviewing the program, the Commit-
tee could try to institute changes through the legislative process.
However, this type of limited, ex poste oversight does little to
quell the fears that the Executive Branch can use drones to
avoid invoking the Hostilities Provision.
Another potential solution is for Congress to take the position
that indirect U.S. casualties are still within the framework of the
106 Matthew Fleischman, Note, A Functional Distribution of War Powers, 13 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIs. & PuB. POL'Y 137, 137-38 (2010).
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Hostilities Provision. This position would allow Congress to
deem drone strikes as hostilities because of the increased vio-
lence that results from the strike. If Congress sets this prece-
dent, it would alert the current and future Presidents that drone
campaigns, which lead to aggressive acts against Americans, will
not be considered exempt from the WPR.
This proposal is weaker than amending the WPR or setting a
historical precedent because incorporating indirect U.S. casual-
ties into the Hostilities Provision will only cause more confusion
and ambiguity. It is often very difficult to ascertain the relation-
ship between a retaliatory attack and a drone strike.'1 7 As such,
the best solution for fixing the WPR in the context of drone
warfare is to either amend the Hostilities Provision or set a his-
torical precedent that clearly establishes limitations to the Exec-
utive Branch's power to conduct drone strikes.
IV. INTRODUCTION TO CYBER-WARFARE
Another warfare tactic of the future that poses serious
problems for the WPR is cyber-warfare. As mentioned above,
President Obama opted not to use cyber-warfare in the Libyan
Civil War, but his intense deliberation on the issue demonstrates
the emergence of this new strategy.'" 8 Today, the United States
is one of the world leaders in cyber-warfare; however, its defen-
sive capabilities against cyber-attacks have been questioned."19
Admiral Mike McConnell, former Director of National Intelli-
gence, stated in 2009 that the United States is not adequately
prepared for cyber-warfare. 2 o As a result, the United States and
many other state and non-state actors are actively trying to in-
crease their technological capabilities because there is a real
possibility that many of the wars of the future will be fought not
on the battlefield but in the arena of cyber-space.121
Cyber-warfare is a relatively new tactic, but in the last five
years, it has become an increasingly popular one. Russia's inva-
sion of Georgia in 2008 provides the most prominent example
117 See Singer, supra note 72.
118 See Schmitt & Shanker, supra note 74.






of a state actor using cyber-warfare.12 2 The Russians used cyber-
warfare to shut down many of Georgia's defense capabilities
right before the military invasion began. 1 23 This was the first
publicly known time that a state used cyber-warfare in an armed
conflict with another state. 1 24 The United States has also imple-
mented cyber-tactics, but not yet in an armed conflict. Begin-
ning during the George W. Bush Administration and
accelerating during the Obama Administration, the United
States has been targeting Iran's nuclear facilities with viruses.12 1
The most famous cyber-attack against Iran was the virus,
Stuxnet.'2 1 It must be noted that it is not altogether clear
whether the United States was responsible for the virus because
it has not claimed responsibility. 1 27 However, there is widespread
belief that the United States at least played a role in Stuxnet's
creation. 1 2 This virus targeted nuclear facilities and caused cen-
trifuges "to spin out of control, ultimately destroying [them]"
and setting back the Iranian nuclear program.12 9 This well-
known example illustrates the capabilities of cyber-warfare be-
cause cyber-technologies have now advanced to a point where
they can cause actual destruction through cyberspace.
A. DEFINING CYBER-WARFARE AND ITS EFFECTS
Cyber-warfare has been defined in multiple ways. Major Arie
Schaap of the U.S. Air Force defines "cyberwarfare operations"
as the "'use of network-based capabilities of one state to disrupt,
deny, degrade, manipulate, or destroy information resident in
computers and computer networks, or the computers and net-
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works themselves, of another state.' "130 The California Law Re-
view defines cyber-warfare as having: (1) an objective to
undermine the function of a computer network; (2) a "political
or national security purpose"; and (3) "[e]ffects equivalent to
those of a conventional armed attack," i.e. physical destruction,
which is sometimes called kinetic damage.13 1 One important
thing to note about this definition is how cyber-warfare differs
from cyber-attacks: the latter consists of the first two elements,
but no physical damage occurs. 13 2 This one difference has sub-
stantial implications for determining whether the Hostilities
Provision has been invoked.
The damage that cyber-warfare can potentially cause is sub-
stantial.1 3 3 As illustrated in the Stuxnet example, cyber-warfare
can directly cause physical damage. Although there were no cas-
ualties related to the Stuxnet virus,134 the physical damage re-
sulting from cyber-warfare can harm unlucky people who are
near the targeted destruction. However, the more significant
concern is the indirect effect of cyber-warfare."" As demon-
strated in the Russia-Georgia war, cyber-warfare can knock out
defensive capabilities of the opposing military, making it much
easier to inflict more damage via traditional military means.13 1
However, the greatest indirect concern is the effect that cyber-
warfare will have on the civilian population of an attacked coun-
try.137 Since cyber-warfare is often aimed at crippling the infra-
structure of a state, cyber-attacks will likely knock out the power
grid." It is conceivable that power will be lost for weeks or even
months.1 3 1 Civilian deaths will multiply, first in hospitals and
nursing homes, and then in cities and on the road as civil order
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breaks down.140 These risks will only increase as the world be-
comes more reliant on technology for safety needs.1 4 '
B. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE WPR FOR INCORPORATING
CYBER-WARFARE
Cyber-warfare poses a number of difficult and complex legal
issues relating to separation of powers and the WPR. Congress
has been largely silent on cyber-warfare matters, and this silence
could be seen as giving the President full discretion under the
analysis articulated by Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown v.
Sawyer.' Because Congress has largely been silent, the WPR is
one of the few checks on the Executive Branch.'4 3 However,
since cyber-warfare is a new tactic and is so unique compared to
other types of warfare, the WPR offers little to no practical
guidance.14
This is especially true when examining the legal significance
of the Hostilities Provision in the cyber-warfare context. Similar
to the drone warfare issue, given the history of the WPR, it is
highly unlikely that the President will report cyber-warfare
under § 1543(a) (1) and limit his decision-making power. 1 4 5 As a
result, the Hostilities Provision will invoke a sixty-day clock only
when U.S. Armed Forces have suffered casualties or when there
is an imminent risk of casualties.' 46 However, under this frame-
work, the United States' use of cyber-warfare against another
state would not invoke the sixty-day clock because it is highly
unlikely that U.S. troops would have suffered casualties.44 Like
the Predator drone problem, this creates a dangerous proposi-
tion under the WPR because the Executive Branch can conduct
cyber-warfare around the world without congressional approval
due to the nonexistent danger to American troops.'4" Because
of this implication, changes to the WPR are necessary to keep it
relevant in the context of cyber-warfare.
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One potential solution is to amend the Hostilities Provision to
incorporate cyber-warfare, much in the same way as stated above
for Predator drones. Congress wrote the Hostilities Provision in
the 1970s when cyber-warfare was practically nonexistent.4 9
Congress could redefine the hostilities standard not as potential
for U.S. casualties, but as potential for indirect U.S. casualties or
casualties in general, regardless of state allegiance. Congress
could also add a provision that states that cyber-warfare is the
equivalent of hostilities. These proposed changes would limit
the Executive Branch's unilateral discretion to wage a costly
cyber-war with another country without triggering the sixty-day
clock because the Hostilities Provision would be easier to impli-
cate in a context that resembles traditional war. The Executive
Branch would have to consult with Congress, thus satisfying the
WPR's original intent.150
These solutions are problematic for a variety of reasons. First,
unlike the Predator drone context, broadening the scope of the
Hostilities Provision will not make it easier for the Provision to
be implicated. Pinpointing when a Predator drone has been de-
stroyed is easy'"' and involves few, if any, difficult inquiries con-
cerning whether it was a casualty under the proposed changes to
the Hostilities Provision asserted above; however, in the cyber-
warfare context, such a determination is much harder to make
because the indirect effects of cyber-warfare cause most of the
substantial damage.'12 This is problematic because indirect
threats are much more difficult to quantify-there are many
variables relating to the strength of the correlation between the
cyber-attack and potential indirect casualties.1 5 3 Since the Judi-
cial Branch would probably not tackle this issue,15 1 Congress
would be forced to determine a standard for hostilities, which
would likely cause more ambiguity because of partisanship and
the changing makeup of Congress. 5 5
Another problem is that redefining the Hostilities Provision as
it pertains to casualties in general will not stop the Executive
Branch from conducting cyber-warfare. Not all forms of cyber-
149 See Lewis, supra note 134, at 66.
150 See Firmage, supra note 10, at 249.
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warfare result in casualties,' 5 6 yet under this new framework, the
WPR will not cover these actions. For example, the Stuxnet virus
did not involve any casualties,15 7 but if it were more advanced
and permanently crippled the Iranian nuclear facilities, its use
could equate to an act of war that Iran would retaliate against;
however, it would still not invoke the Hostilities Provision. This
hypothetical situation of a conflict escalating without congres-
sional input is a major issue the WPR was designed to prevent.1 5 1
Also, even if the Hostilities Provision is invoked under the new
framework, it will not necessarily prevent unilateral Executive
Branch action. The sixty-day provision for executive notice and
legislative response "is unrealistic for war on a digital battle-
field."15 9 Cyber-warfare is normally not conducted continually
for months on end like traditional warfare. One digital virus is
often all that is necessary to achieve the strategic goals of cyber-
warfare.1 60 As such, the Executive Branch can substantially crip-
ple another country by using cyber-warfare without any input
from Congress and not run afoul of WPR obligations because
the conflict will be over within days.
Another major problem is that involving Congress in the de-
liberation process for cyber-warfare is potentially dangerous. Al-
though the WPR is designed to support congressional
consultation,' this objective might not be optimal in the cyber-
warfare context. The strategy of when to use cyber-warfare is also
different from most other warfare tactics.' 6 2 Cyber-warfare is
only similar to nuclear warfare because both would "come with-
out a clear warning," there is "no reliable defense [ ] against"
them, and the collateral damage would be catastrophic.1 6 1 Un-
like other military tactics, such as drone warfare, where the tem-
poral period for when to strike is much longer and retaliatory
strikes are successful, preemption is the best function and de-
fense for cyber-warfare.' 61 Striking first is crucial because effec-
tive retaliation can be very difficult if a state has been crippled
by cyber-warfare.' 6' This poses serious problems for the WPR.
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Unlike the drone warfare context, where discussing the strike
location is not necessarily detrimental to the military strategy, in
the cyber-warfare context, discussing the issue in Congress will
alert the enemy (due to the transparent legislative process) and
potentially compromise the preemptive strike. It could even en-
danger American citizens because the enemy would want to
preemptively strike the United States as a defensive measure, as-
suming the enemy has the capabilities.
Although redefining the Hostilities Provision to incorporate
cyber-warfare is not the best solution, there are other potential
avenues that could involve Congress in the decision-making pro-
cess and therefore satisfy the original intent of the WPR. First,
Congress could develop strategic guidelines for cyber-warfare
similar to the way it has for nuclear warfare. Congress has held
some hearings on the rules for cyber-warfare, such as the March
2012 hearing with Keith Alexander (the head of the U.S. Cyber
Command), but these hearings have not updated the current
ground rules for cyber-warfare.' 6 6 This is problematic because
the rules were written in 2005 and are inadequate for current
cyber-warfare technologies.1 6 7 As a result, Congress should take
initiative and help implement an updated procedural frame-
work. Congress could work more closely with the Executive
Branch and the military to develop a flexible policy that reflects
the distinctive technology and strategy of cyber-warfare.' 6 l Con-
gress could also require that the Executive Branch report all in-
stances of cyber-warfare so that Congress can ensure that the
Executive Branch is not abusing its discretion.' This policy
would set out the procedures for how and under what circum-
stances the United States could conduct cyber-warfare. 7 o Con-
gress could also develop a policy that defines the types of
countermeasures that are "legally and strategically appropriate
for different types of cyber-attacks."1 7 1 These proposed solutions
might not adequately satisfy all the goals of the WPR, but given
the practicalities of cyber-warfare, a pre-defined cyber-warfare
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policy still provides Congress with the best method to incorpo-
rate itself in the decision-making process.
Although Congress should adopt a policy that sets out the
procedure for cyber-warfare, it is important that this policy re-
main limited.'7 2 At this point, there are still many uncertainties
regarding the future of cyber-warfare, and it could even be ar-
gued that the lack of hard-line limitations "may be positive" be-
cause "laying down clear legal markers before having a
developed understanding of these capabilities may problemati-
cally limit their effective use.""7 It is also important to not create
"red lines that proscribe the use of [cyber-warfare] capabilities
[because it] will create reluctance and trepidation among strate-
gists and will lead to disadvantages in combat situations. "174
Another potential solution is to involve congressional intelli-
gence committees in the strategy of cyber-warfare."7 Unlike the
drone warfare context, this solution is more suitable to the reali-
ties of cyber-warfare. Congress has already adopted a measure
that keeps them "fully and currently informed of all covert ac-
tions which are . . . engaged in by . .. any department, agency,
or entity of the United States [g]overnment."176 That provision
should be expanded to incorporate cyber-warfare since cyber-
warfare has often been considered an intelligence activity. 7 7
Since intelligence committees are not entirely transparent, 7 8
this would give Congress a role in cyber-warfare decisions with-
out impeding the military by disclosing U.S strategy. This role,
however, should only include the potential to raise "legal issues
with the [E]xecutive [B] ranch, as well as provide policy advice as
to the wisdom of employing these capabilities in such circum-
stances."'1 7 Congress should not have any veto power over the
actions.8 o Even though the WPR's goal of having Congress fully
involved will not be satisfied,"8 ' given the realities of cyber-war-
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fare, this is one of the few practical ways to actively involve Con-
gress in the decision-making process for cyber-warfare.
For the foregone reasons, satisfying the WPR's goals in the
cyber-warfare context requires substantially different solutions
than in the drone warfare context. Given the practicalities and
dangers of cyber-warfare, the Legislative Branch needs to cede
some of its power under the WPR and take up new responsibili-
ties because, otherwise, it risks becoming obsolete in the deci-
sion-making process or even endangering the country itself.
Only by limiting its influence can the Legislative Branch ensure,
to the greatest possible extent, that the goals of the WPR are
fulfilled.
V. CONCLUSION
The Hostilities Provision is not adequately equipped to deal
with the new military strategies of drone warfare and cyber-war-
fare. As a result, the Executive Branch has substantially more
discretion to use military power than the original WPR drafters
intended. However, Congress can remedy this problem by im-
plementing a few solutions. In the drone warfare context, Con-
gress needs to either incorporate drones into the definition of
hostilities or set a historical precedent that drone strikes will
amount to hostilities. These proposed solutions will severely
limit the Executive Branch's ability to engage in conflicts where
American casualties are not at risk, but the conflict nevertheless
has substantial foreign policy implications. With regard to cyber-
warfare, the solution is more complicated because the tactic is
distinct from other warfare tactics. Incorporating cyber-warfare
into the hostilities definition would create more problems than
it would solve, and thus, a different approach is needed. To ade-
quately prepare for cyber-warfare, Congress cannot fully rely on
the current version of the WPR because its method of involving
Congress in the deliberation process is ill-adapted for the cyber-
warfare context. Thus, to actively participate in the cyber-war-
fare decision-making process, Congress must work with the Ex-
ecutive Branch to develop ex ante guidelines for how and when
to conduct cyber-warfare operations. Congress can also use its
Intelligence Committee or another similar committee as a check
on the Executive Branch. Full congressional involvement is
not productive because of transparency concerns; however, hav-
ing special committee involvement can alleviate this concern be-
182 See Dycus, supra note 144, at 158.
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cause these committees are afforded secrecy privileges.1 3
Although these proposed solutions for both drone warfare and
cyber-warfare are not without their problems, they offer the
most practical and realistic avenues for Congress to fulfill the
WPR's goal of greater congressional involvement in war
decisions.
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